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Multi-level voting and party competition in vertically simultaneous 
elections: the case of Ukraine 
 
 
Abstract: 
 
Vertically simultaneous elections to state-wide and regional legislatures provide us with a naturally 
occurring experiment in which to examine regionalism and multi-level voting. We examine the 2006 
vertically and horizontally simultaneous state-wide and regional elections in Ukraine to determine how 
the internal dynamics of regionalism within a state account for the dissimilarity of voting behaviour 
across electoral levels.  Drawing on the party competition literature we demonstrate that variations in 
both supply (parties) and demand (voters) produce considerable dissimilarity between regional and 
state results, with lower levels of consolidation and greater fractionalisation at the regional level. We 
show that political cleavages operate differently across levels, that regional distinctiveness rather than 
regional authority better predicts first order-ness in regional elections and that voters display varying 
tolerance for polarisation at the regional and state level (132 words) 
 
Keywords: multi-level voting; second-order theory; regionalism; Ukraine; simultaneous elections; 
party competition; regional parties 
 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
Current research on multi-level voting provides us with contradictory expectations about 
the anticipated similarity of voter preferences across simultaneous elections and we can 
distinguish between second-order and balance approaches  For second order theorists 
(Reif and Schmitt 1980; Reif 1984, 1985, 1997), votes cast in regional, sub-state elections 
might be cast on state issues, with voters using evaluations of state government 
performance to determine their vote choices across both electoral levels.1  Second order 
theory would therefore predict similar political preferences expressed in simultaneous 
 2 
state-wide parliamentary and regional elections if regional elections are second-order 
contests.  Balance theorists (Alesina and Rosenthal 1995, 1996; Fiorina 1996; Erikson and 
Filipov 2001) would suggest that voters consciously stabilise the partisan composition of 
the political system, using sub-state elections to offset or balance the partisan distribution 
of power in the state arena (or vice versa).  This would lead us to expect dissimilar 
preferences in simultaneous state and regional elections.   To evaluate these rival claims 
we examine voting behaviour and the nature of party competition across two electoral 
levels during the vertically and horizontally simultaneous state-wide parliamentary and 
regional 2006 elections in Ukraine.2  The result is a considerable advance on our 
understandings of voting in multi-level polities and the ability of existing voting theories 
to account for electoral trends in post-Communist states. 
 
 
2. Literature Review 
For what we might call balance theorists, voters not only cast ballots differently at distinct 
electoral levels, they do so consciously to facilitate a partisan balance across the political 
system as a whole. Such research, which originally highlighted the way American voters 
sought to establish a partisan balance across the Presidency and Congress to ensure 
moderate policy choices   (Erikson 1988, 1990; Fiorina 1996, Alesina and Rosenthal 
1995, 1996; Scheve and Tomz 1999; Mebane 2000; Mughan 1988), has since been 
adapted to examine cross-level voting in federal political systems, most frequently in the 
U.S. (Simon, Ostrom and Marra 1991; Simon 1989; Carsey and Wright 1998), Canada 
(Erikson and Filipov 2001) and Germany (Gabriel 1989; Kern and Hainmüller 2006; 
Lohmann, Brady and Rivers 1997), as well as by-elections and local elections in the UK 
(Cook and Ramsden 1997; Curtice and Payne 1991). Although the balance hypothesis 
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originates from an examination of mid-term US elections, it has been shown to travel well 
to multi-level systems.  Such research suggests that voters prefer moderate policy choices, 
and seek to facilitate these by delivering a system that balances partisan strength across 
institutions or levels.  It is not surprising that such research originated in a two-party 
system, but research in Canada and Germany proves also that it may help us to understand 
the motivations of voters in multi-party systems. In such systems, the issues on which 
voters seek to establish a balance need not be economic left-right, but can include issues 
of national constitutional importance.  Timing, in this sense the length of time between 
state and sub-state elections, is irrelevant.  Regardless of whether elections are 
consecutive or concurrent we would expect dissimilar voting preferences in state-wide 
and regional elections.  
For second order theorists, by contrast, the congruence or dissimilarity of voting 
decisions is conditional on what is ‘at stake’ in each election and the timing of elections.  
Those casting ballots in first order elections - when there is something ‘at stake’ because 
governments can be formed, or legislatures have considerable autonomy - use cues or 
evaluations specific to that democratic level (Reif and Schmitt 1980; Reif 1984; 1985; 
1997).  In other words, voters casting ballots in state elections evaluate the performance of 
the state government, identify their preferences for state policy, or use cues provided by 
state political parties, to reach a voting decision. Those voting in second order elections 
might rely on cues and issues relevant to levels of ‘first-order’ importance.  In practice, 
this can mean that voters casting ballots in European, regional or by-elections vote 
according to state issues or the performance of state governments, each second order 
election effectively serving as a referendum on government popularity or valence issues 
such as its handling of the economy.  Such research, which claims that the salience of 
particular institutional levels affects the way in which voters reach their voting decisions, 
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has often been interpreted in a way that suggests regional elections are typically less 
important than state elections.  This was not the original claim of Reif and Schmidt, who 
merely emphasised the influence of varying levels of institutional salience on voters.     
Furthermore, for second order theorists, the timing of state and sub-state elections 
would influence what we might expect of voter preferences.  Even if voters consistently 
use state cues to reach their voting decisions for both regional and state elections, we 
should not expect uniform vote choices from voters.  A regional election held during the 
honeymoon period for a state government might well return the governing party to office 
in the region as well.  One held later in the electoral cycle might punish the state 
governing party for its record.  Reif and Schmitt (1980) argued that we can observe a 
cyclical effect to support for governing parties.  Critically for us, however, the second 
order thesis would suggest that for elections held on the same day, voters would exhibit 
uniform preferences across levels, if the regional elections were not themselves first order 
contests (Hough and Jeffery 2006).  This raises three distinctions between second order 
and balance approaches.  For balance approaches, timing and state performance are less 
relevant, as decisions are motivated by the logic of balance: state-level incumbents will 
always fare worse in sub-state elections since the role of such elections is to balance the 
results of state contests.  For second order approaches, timing, the salience of the sub-state 
legislature and the evaluation of state performance will determine whether a governing 
party maintains or loses support.  In simultaneous elections where the regional 
institutional level is weak – where regional elections truly are second order contests – we 
would expect similar results.3 
There is, of course, a considerable body of research which suggests that certain 
types of polities are more or less likely to produce regional elections that operate as 
second order contests.  Certainly there is a growing consensus that regional elections need 
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not necessarily be second order, that voters demonstrate distinct preferences (Heath et al 
1999, Hough and Jeffery 2003, Wolinetz and Carty 2006, Schakel and Jeffery 2011), and 
take into account the performance of regional governments (Cutler 2008, Johns et al 
2009) or the regional economy (Atkeson and Partin 1995, Leyden and Borrelli 1995, 
Ebeid and Rodden 2006). Both Anderson (2006) and Cutler (2004) show that confusion 
over attributions of responsibility in federal systems can at the very least dampen the 
propensity of voters to punish state governments for any mishandling of the economy. We 
have reasons to suspect that ‘split–level democratic citizenship’ (Cutler 2008), in which 
voters perform differing evaluations across multiple levels, is easier in federal systems 
where sub-state jurisdiction is obvious to voters.  This was, of course, one of the original 
claims of Reif and Schmidt, that the institutional salience of different democratic levels 
affects whether individuals treat the contests as first or second order.  We know, likewise, 
that turnout is not uniformly lower in regional elections (Schakel and Dandoy 2014, 
Horiuchi 2005) but dependent on regional identity and regional autonomy (Henderson and 
McEwen 2010).  Regional elections are more likely to operate as first order contests in 
regions where regional identity is high, or there is a greater degree of perceived 
distinctiveness, whether because of regional language, regional cultural institutions or 
regional parties  (Henderson and McEwen 2010).  This sits comfortably with research 
showing the resilience of regions to operate as distinct small political worlds (Agnew 
1988; Agnew 1994; Elkins and Simeon 1980; Pallarés and Keating 2003; Shin and 
Agnew 2002).  In short, the extent to which second order theory would predict similar 
preferences in simultaneous elections depends on whether regional elections are truly 
second order.  How then might we evaluate the claims of second order and balance 
theorists? 
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We believe that the literature on party competition holds the key to distinguishing 
between the relative merits of balance and second order approaches.  Research on party 
competition is useful for two reasons. First, debates about party nationalisation – the 
homogeneity of party strength across a state (Caramani 2004; Bochsler 2010) – suggest 
that we might find dissimilar trends at the state and sub-state level.  Second, in its focus 
on supply and demand factors party competition research helps us to understand whether 
voter behaviour alone or voter and party behaviour is responsible for dissimilar 
preferences. We address each theme in turn. 
Research on party competition suggests we might expect greater nationalisation – 
greater similarity of parties’ vote shares across the state - at state elections (Jones and 
Mainwaring 2003) and greater regional diversity for sub-state elections.  This holds for 
Central and Eastern Europe (Meleshevich 2007) as well as Western Europe (Caramani 
2004). Schakel and Jeffery (2013) argue that regional elections display lower levels of 
nationalisation, with variation increasing markedly as the timing between parliamentary 
and regional elections widens.  Such research would suggest greater levels of inter-
regional similarity for simultaneous elections.  The indicators upon which such claims are 
based include the degree of congruence between party shares across sub-state units and 
variations in the effective number of parties across regions.  These help us to identify the 
levels of nationalisation, and in so doing understand the capacity for similar voting results 
across electoral levels.   
 For our purposes, the party competition literature is also useful because it focuses 
on both the supply and demand side of electoral contests (Rose and Mishler 2010).  
Political parties clearly reflect the supply-side of electoral competition (Marsh and Norris, 
1997; Katz 2008; Brunsbach, et al 2012; Pallarés and Keating 2006).  Parties select 
candidates, establish electoral agendas and develop manifestos in the hope of introducing 
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their policy programmes when in office. Differences in the nature and number of parties 
standing for seats might affect the electoral outcomes at state-wide and regional elections 
as well as the potential for the similarity of results.  If parties standing for office in 
regional elections do not contest seats in state-wide elections, then supply-side factors will 
affect the extent to which voters could ever express similar preferences across electoral 
levels.  Voters, by contrast, present the demand side of the equation, and might make 
different voting decisions when faced with the same parties in different electoral arenas 
(Marsh and Norris, 1997; Katz 2008; Rose and Mishler 2010).  Second order theory has 
long argued that voters are more willing to cast ballots for smaller parties in second order 
contests, where the stakes of electoral competition are low, than they are in first order 
contests.  Of course we might find variations in both supply and demand across electoral 
levels.  We know from studies of electoral competition that we are more likely to find 
regional or regionalist parties standing for seats in sub-state elections - where the chance 
of forming a government increases significantly - than in state-wide elections where such 
parties can at best hope to operate as swing votes in the national legislature.  We can 
distinguish here between regional parties, which receive their vote share in one or a 
restricted number of regions (Brancati 2008) and regionalist parties, which seek greater 
self-government for particular regions (De Winter 1998).4 Both tend, in varying degrees, 
to appeal to regional identities that are popular within certain territorially bounded 
communities and to set agendas that are most relevant for particular regional arenas rather 
than for state-wide arenas  (Schakel and Jeffery 2013; Passarelli and Tuorto 2012).  Their 
presence provides an opportunity for variations in voter behaviour. 
This leads us to our two main research questions: How similar or dissimilar are the 
voting results across vertically simultaneous; and how might we account for variations in 
support? For the first question we are interested not only in the similarity of preferences, 
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but interested too in whether we can record similar levels of nationalisation, 
fragmentation (Sartori, 1976: 120) and salient political cleavages5 across electoral levels.  
For the second question, we are interested to see whether regions which are typically 
more likely to produce first order sub-state contests are more likely to demonstrate 
dissimilar results, and interested too in the extent to which any variations in support are 
the product of supply as well as demand side factors.  This leads to our more general aim, 
to distinguish between the ability of second-order and balance ‘theories’ to account for 
multi-level voting in simultaneous elections (and identify the conditions under which they 
may do so).   
For the most part, efforts to examine multi-level voting have focused 
predominantly on the demand side of the equation (Johnston 1980; Clarke and Stewart 
1987; Stewart and Clarke 1988; Erikson and Filipov 2001; Jeffery and Hough 2003; 
Cutler 2008; Hough and Jeffery 2005; Henderson and McEwen 2010; Schakel and 
Dandoy 2014).  We believe, however, that variations in supply-side factors at different 
levels can affect the capacity of voters to express similar preferences across multiple 
levels and furthermore believe we can disaggregate among supply factors.  We are 
interested in how parties coalesce into clusters, and whether the nature of clusters changes 
across levels.  Our assessment of second order and balance approaches therefore takes 
into consideration demand-side behaviour as well as supply-side variations.  Of particular 
interest to the supply side is the presence and role of regional parties. 
If, as second-order theorists claim, smaller and more regional parties are more 
likely to contest seats at the sub-state level, voters may be given the opportunity to 
express dissimilar preferences at different levels.  Of interest, however, is the extent to 
which such parties offer different political cleavages according to which electoral 
competition might be structured, or whether they reinforce existing political cleavages at 
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the state level.  For example, the absence of regionalist parties in parliamentary elections 
and their presence in regional elections might introduce a regionalist dimension to party 
competition in sub-state elections that is otherwise lacking in state elections.  
Alternatively, regional parties might integrate themselves into a left-right political 
cleavage, providing merely an additional means of supporting a left or right-wing political 
bloc.  Research interested merely in dissimilarity would view these two situations as 
identical, but a focus on political competition seeks to distinguish the ways in which 
voting and the context of voting might vary across different electoral levels.  
 
3.  Hypotheses 
We believe that second order approaches are correct in their emphasis on institutional 
salience but believe that regional legislatures can serve as important organs of regional 
expression even in cases where institutional jurisdictional authority is minimal.  
Therefore: 
H1: We will find significantly dissimilar voting patterns vertically simultaneous 
elections 
In keeping with the literature (Jones and Mainwaring 2003; Meleshevich 2007) on 
nationalisation and fragmentation, to the extent that there are dissimilar preferences across 
levels: 
H2: We will find higher nationalisation and lower fragmentation for state 
elections and lower nationalisation and higher fragmentation for regional 
elections 
Furthermore, if we cluster parties by blocks, according to, for example, their economic 
position, attitudes towards language, foreign policy and history, we will be able to see 
whether voters support different parties but consistently back similar party clusters.  
 10 
Support for one right-wing state-wide party might vary from one electoral level to the 
next, but if we group together all right-wing parties we would expect to see greater 
consistency of support.  This clustering also allows us to determine if voter consistency is 
better explained by economic or identity motivations.  Therefore: 
H3: We will find greater consistency when we examine electoral competition by 
electoral clusters rather than parties 
We believe that regional jurisdictions possessing linguistic and ethnic profiles that 
distinguish them from their neighbours, and in which there is an appetite for additional 
regional autonomy, are also more likely to develop political landscapes in which regional 
parties contest seats and where regional elections are fought on regional issues.  We 
expect not only that regional elections will therefore be more fragmented but that the 
degree of fragmentation is dependent on levels of regional identity, cultural diversity and 
support for regional autonomy, features which we believe are more likely to produce split-
level citizenship.  This will have obvious consequences on the extent to which we can find 
similar preferences across levels.  Therefore: 
H4: The similarity of voting preferences will vary by regional identity and 
measures of regional distinctiveness, with more dissimilar preferences in regions 
where identity and perceived regional distinctiveness are stronger.   
H5: Dissimilar voting patterns across regional and state elections will be 
explained by the stronger support for regional parties in ‘distinctive’ regions 
 
4. Methodology 
4. 1 Case selection  
Vertical simultaneity across state and regional elections is relatively rare outside 
the United States. Fabre estimates that there have been fewer than 20 instances in post-
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war Western Europe when national elections coincided with regional elections (Fabre 
2010). Often this involves a single region holding its elections on the same date as state 
elections. Since 1996, for example, elections in the autonomous community of Andalusia 
have been held on the same day as Spanish elections.  Rarer still is a combination of 
horizontal (all regional elections at the same time) and vertical (region and state at the 
same time) simultaneity, in which all the regions across a state elect their regional 
legislatures and national legislature on the same day. This has occurred, for example, in 
France in 1986, and in Belgium in 1995 and 1999.  Simultaneous elections to the national 
parliament and regional assemblies is a regular practice in Ukraine (with the exception of 
2010); however, only the 2006 multi-level elections in Ukraine were held according to the 
same electoral rules, in this case, proportional representation with no independents.  
 
We have opted to study the 2006 vertically and horizontally simultaneous elections in 
Ukraine for five reasons. First, there is relatively little ‘at stake’ in regional elections in 
Ukraine. In the 2006 elections, Ukraine was a unitary state with 27 meso-level 
administrative units: 24 oblasts, two special status cities (Kyiv and Sevastopil) and one 
autonomous republic, Crimea.  With the exception of Crimea (Sasse, 2007), regional 
legislatures do not form governments but share authority with regional state 
administrations.6 Furthermore, the 450-seat national legislature, Verkhovna Rada, is 
unicameral.  There is no upper chamber that represents regional interests.   If, as Cutler 
(2008) argues, voters are more likely to have ‘split-level citizenship’ in polities with clear 
areas of jurisdiction across levels, and where regions wield clear autonomy over policy, 
we must assume this is less likely to occur in Ukraine, where regional autonomy is not 
well established.   Were we to find a significant difference in voting patterns across 
parliamentary and regional elections we would have reason to doubt the critical 
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importance of institutional salience upon which second order theory hinges many of its 
claims. 
Second, Ukraine is regionally diverse, portrayed as a ‘state of regions’ (Sasse 
2001), with different components formerly belonging to different empires and states 
(Katchanovski 2006). Indeed it is often perceived as a country with two different halves, a 
predominantly rural, Catholic, Ukrainian-speaking, European-oriented and liberal 
Western half, and an Orthodox, Russian-speaking, pro-Soviet and pro-communist East 
(Aberg 2000; Barrington 1997; Birch 2000; Solchanyk 1994; Hesli 1995; Kuzio 1998; 
Shulman 1999; Kubicek 2000; Katchanovski, 2001, 2008; Munro 2007; Clem and 
Craumer 2008), although as Sasse (2001) points out, various cultural and social cleavages 
are cross-cutting rather than mutually reinforcing (see also Arel 1995; Kulyk 2008; 
Matsuzato 2001, Wolczuk 2002, Rodgers 2006).  As a result, Ukraine provides a useful 
case where regional institutional authority is low but regionalism and regional identities 
are strong (Stepan 2005; Sasse 2001, 2010; Wolczuk 2002; Barrington and Herron 2004; 
Razumkov Centre 2007) and politically salient (Hinich, Khmelko and Ordeschook 1999; 
Miller, Klobucar, Reisinger and Hesli 1998; Barrington and Faranda 2009; O’Loughlin 
and Bell 1999) which enables us to determine the precise roles for legislative competence 
and perceptions of regional distinctiveness.     
Third, Ukrainian electoral institutions have typically been designed to exert a 
nationalising influence on party competition. All parties are officially state-wide although 
they have core regions in which they gain particular support.7  The 2004 Law on Elections 
of Deputies in Ukraine has allowed regional branches of state-wide political parties to 
create electoral blocs and stand for regional elections in one or several regions8. This 
provides new institutional opportunities for regional parties and blocs (Laboratory of 
Legislative Initiatives 2006) that were formerly not possible.  
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Fourth, the 2006 elections in particular provide a useful case study.  Until 2006, all 
regional elections were held according to a majoritarian electoral system and included 
large numbers of independents.  The 2006 parliamentary (Herron 2007; Clem and 
Craumer 2008) and regional (Syneokiy 2006) elections, however, both employed 
proportional representation with a 3% electoral threshold and excluded independent 
candidates.  The 2006 elections were also recognised as free and fair by the OSCE and 
numerous international and domestic observers (OSCE/ODIHR 2006, see Myagkov and 
Ordeshook 2005 for an analysis of electoral fraud in earlier elections). 
Fifth, multi-level voting behaviour and party competition in Central and Eastern 
Europe is heavily understudied. However dominant the state focus on voting behaviour in 
Western Europe, this is far more prevalent in former republics of the Soviet Union. In 
2002 Tucker lamented that there had been only one – Russian – study of regional party 
competition in any post-Communist state.9  Despite academic attention to the importance 
of the 1990 regional elections in the USSR as vehicles of democratisation, post-
communist regional elections remain understudied. As a result, claims regarding post-
communist voting behaviour and party systems are based almost exclusively on studies of 
national elections (Kuzio 1995; Birch 1995, 1998; Bojcun 1995, 2011; Miller et al 1998; 
Wilson. and Birch 1999; Clem and Craumer, 2008; Copsey 2006, 2008; Ishiyma 2002; 
Meleschevich 2007; Zimmer and Haran 2008; Bochsler 2010. For exceptions in the case 
of Russia see Gel’man and Golosov 1998; Golosov 1999; Moraski and Reisinger 2003).  
 
4.2 Data and variables 
To analyse the dynamics of multi-level voting we have created a dataset that employs 
regions as cases.  Electoral data on vote shares in the 2006 parliamentary and regional 
elections are from official election results and electoral reports.  Our analysis relies on 
aggregate data.  Individual recall of voting decisions in surveys, including whether a 
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respondent cast a ballot and which party was supported, is heavily conditioned by social 
desirability.  We know that individuals are more likely to say that they cast a ballot when 
in fact they did not (Bernstein, Chadha and Montjoy 2001; Karp and Banducci 2008) and 
we know also that respondents are more likely to say that they backed the eventual 
winners.  One benefit of using official electoral returns, therefore, is that it avoids these 
problems.  Aggregate data raise other issues of validity, however.  We are able to identify 
correlations between particular variables but unable to demonstrate their effect at the 
individual level.  A region in which we know there to be a high degree of support for 
regional identity might demonstrate greater support for a regional party, or might display 
greater dissimilarity of preferences across electoral levels, but we cannot at this stage 
determine whether individuals with a greater strength of pride cast their ballots in this 
particular way.  Furthermore, aggregate stability of responses might mask considerable 
individual-level volatility in voter preferences (LeDuc, Clarke, Jenson and Pammett 
1980).  We must therefore remain mindful of the ecological fallacy when we interpret our 
results. 
To begin our analysis we classified parties according to three dimensions. We 
distinguished, first, between government and opposition parties and blocs, a full list of 
which appears in the appendix.10  We also identified regional parties, using Brancati’s 
definition (2008) of parties that seek seats in a restricted number of regions.  Region-only 
parties can be found in eight of the 27 meso-level administrative units and in 2006 
included ethnic parties beyond Russian or pro-Russian ones.11   We further distinguish 
between the regionalist (De Winter 1998) aims of such parties, separating a) those parties 
that appeal to the regional identities of those in territorially-bounded polities and position 
themselves at the extreme ends of state-wide cleavages such as language, which we refer 
to as ‘ideological’ regional parties12 and b) those parties that claim to represent the 
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interests of territorial communities better than state-wide parties but refer neither to 
regionalist agendas nor state-wide ideological cleavages.13  This classification was based 
on the content of party manifestos, as well as domestic analytical reports on campaigning 
(Yermolayev et al 2006; Laboratory of Legislative Initiatives 2006). 
While studying stable multi-party systems, academics group parties into party 
families (Deschouwer 2000; Fitzmaurice 2004), but such an approach is not necessarily 
appropriate when party systems are not fully institutionalised (Mainwaring and Scully, 
1995). We believe that clustering parties would be more helpful in this case, because it 
helps us to identify consistent cleavages within the Ukrainian electorate at a time when 
the existence of parties can be fairly short-lived.  We have created four clusters to 
examine the consistency of support across electoral levels, an economic (left-right) 
cluster, and three additional cleavages we believe tap identity considerations: attitudes to 
language, attitudes to foreign policy, and attitudes to history.  These cleavages are 
perceived to have long-standing relevance to Ukrainian voters (Khmelko 2007) and were 
predicted to structure party competition in the 2006 campaign (Razumkov Centre 2005).  
Our clustering is based on the content of party manifestos.14  Parties and blocs are 
distributed fairly evenly across the economic cluster but their manifestos offered 
consistent approaches across the three identity clusters.  Parties or blocs scoring 1 on the 
foreign policy cluster, for example, tended to have similar scores for the language and 
history clusters.  For this reason in the analysis that follows we have created an ‘average 
identity cluster’ score.  Full details for the scores for each cluster, however, may be found 
in the appendix.   
To evaluate our hypotheses we have calculated several indices, including 
measures of dissimilarity and fractionalization.  To evaluate hypothesis 1, which 
addresses the consistency of voting across multiple levels, we have calculated an index of 
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dissimilarity for all state-wide parties, expanding this to include all parties contesting 
seats in each region.  Our index takes the absolute value of difference in party 
performance across state-wide parliamentary and regional elections.  We have then 
calculated an aggregate score for each region by adding together the absolute differences 
for each of the statewide parties and dividing by two (Johnson 1980, Pallares and Keating 
2003).15  Our state-wide party dissimilarity index allows us to evaluate how state-wide 
parties fare across state and regional elections.  Our total party dissimilarity index allows 
us to examine the nature of party competition as a whole, rather than just the performance 
of certain types of political parties.16   
To account for variations in simultaneous voting behaviour across state and 
regional elections, we have calculated two measures of electoral fractionalization within 
each region for both state and regional elections: the proportion of votes earned by the 
two largest parties; and the effective number of parties (ENP).  We are using the Laakso 
and Taagepera (1979) formula for the effective number of parties:  one divided by the 
sum of the squared proportions earned by each political party (see also Blais and Carty 
1991).17  The results will provide us with additional methods of evaluating voting 
behaviour across state and regional elections.   
To evaluate hypothesis 4 we will employ the previously constructed dissimilarity 
scores as dependent variables in OLS regression.  Our independent variables include 
various measures of identity and distinctiveness.  Drawing on the comparative sub-state 
political behaviour literature (Pallares and Keating 2006; Wyn Jones and Scully 2006; 
Hough and Jeffery 2006; Henderson and McEwen 2010) we have constructed a measure 
of regional identity using data from the 1999 World Values Survey dataset. The indicator 
reflects the proportion of respondents who identified the region as the geographic group to 
which they are most attached.  Our other identity variables employ data from a 2007 
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survey of regional identities conducted by the Razumkov Centre. 18  We seek to separate 
attitudes to culture and attitudes to language, and distinguish too between attitudes to 
Ukraine and attitudes to Russia.19  We believe these to be important fault lines, 
particularly relevant to us because of the possible east-west variation in responses we 
might find.  We also include two measures of perceived regional strength.  The regional 
autonomy variable measures support for greater institutional authority for the meso level, 
and the regional distinctiveness variable reflects the proportion of survey respondents in 
each oblast who believe that eastern and western Ukraine are so different they should be 
considered different peoples.  These we believe are essential to testing hypothesis 4, as 
well as identifying the oblasts in which we are more likely to find regional parties.  In 
addition we have created indicators that relate to the party clusters, including a measure 
capturing identification with and the perceived importance of European identity, and an 
indicator of external identity, which is measured as perceived closeness to Hungary, 
Slovakia, Poland and Romania (see White, McAllister and Feklyunina 2010 on the 
tensions between these).  Last, we have included other indicators as controls, including 
socio-demographic variables such as average educational attainment, average income, 
regional gross domestic product (GDP), and ethnic profile. These regional socio-
demographic data are from the State Statistics Committee. The resulting dataset offers for 
the first time regional-level data on voting behaviour at multiple electoral arenas, political 
cleavages, socio-demographic variables and attitudinal variables on regional identity, 
regional diversity, and views of regional autonomy.  Full details of coding and data 
sources appear in the appendix.   
 
5. Results 
 18 
We begin with a review of the performance of parties and blocs across electoral levels, the 
results of which appear in table 1. The results provide us with two obvious findings.  First, 
the three largest state-wide parties and blocs (Yulia Tymoshenko Bloc, the Party of 
Regions and Our Ukraine Bloc) performed better in the state-wide parliamentary elections 
than they did in the regional ones, regardless of whether they were in (or aligned with) 
government or opposition.  On average they lost between 2.6 and 8.8 percentage points 
from the state to the regional level.  Second order elections theory would predict similar 
results in both electoral arenas, as there is little ‘at stake’ in Ukrainian regional elections, 
while balance approaches would predict voters to offset their government and opposition 
preferences.  A first review therefore gives us reason to question each approach. 
Table 1 about here 
Second, we can see regional trends in the varying success of parties across 
electoral levels. As Table 1 demonstrates, state-wide parties tended to lose most support at 
regional elections in those ‘core’ regions where they fared best in state elections (Copsey 
2006; Hesli 2007; Kachanovski 2008). For smaller state-wide parties, voters’ support 
across electoral levels appears remarkably consistent, as we can see in the dissimilarity 
scores for the Socialist and Communist parties, as well as Pora-PRP, the Vitrenko Bloc, 
and the Kostenko-Pliushch Bloc.  This suggests a possible modification of the second-
order theory where we distinguish not only between decreased support for governing vis-
à-vis opposition parties but for large state-wide parties vis-à-vis smaller parties.  Such a 
conclusion would also provide a new dimension to previous research on the structure of 
party competition and voting behaviour in 2006, all of which has been generated on the 
basis of state-level evidence (Copsey 2006; Hesli 2007; Kachanovski 2008; Clem and 
Craumer 2008). 
Table 2 about here 
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To examine further the position of smaller parties, we examined the performance 
of regional parties, the results of which are in Table 2.  In eight regions, regional parties 
won seats at sub-state elections but not at state elections.  Within these eight regions, total 
support for such parties ranged from 4.58% for the sole regional party in Volynska oblast 
to between 15% and 17% in Crimea and Kyiv. Obviously this affects the degree to which 
support for state-wide parties can be mirrored across state and regional elections. 
Table 3 about here 
To what extent might these results change if we explore clusters of parties rather 
than individual parties across electoral arenas?  Table 4 contains descriptive accounts of 
the performance of our four sets of electoral clusters.  As with parties, we can identify 
those clusters that fared well or poorly at each level.  Right wing parties in economic 
terms perform less well in regional elections, as did those favouring pro-Russian foreign 
policy.  Indeed across the three identity clusters we see that the pro-Russian cluster 
consistently fares less well in regional elections.  One possible interpretation is that 
polarised political options fare better in state-wide elections than in regional elections.  
Parties occupying the middle ground on economic policy, for example, fared better in 
regional elections, suggesting that the electorate is more polarised over economic issues in 
state-wide contests.  This can be seen as a modification of regional elections as balancing 
elections. Rather than achieving a moderate political culture by backing polarised views at 
different levels, voters appear to have differing levels of tolerance for polarised political 
debate at different electoral levels. This is not a uniform finding, however, for we see little 
difference in the performance of the moderate and Ukrainian components of the history 
and language clusters. We can also see that across the three categories for each cluster 
there is greater absolute variation for the economic cluster than for the identity clusters. 
Table 4 about here 
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We turn now to our measures of cross-level competition to evaluate demand and 
supply variations at different levels.  Table 4 provides us with descriptive information 
about party competition in parliamentary and regional elections in each region, outlining 
the most popular party, the proportion earned by the two largest parties and the effective 
number of parties in each contest.  The results also show that there are cross-level 
differences in the effective number of parties, with a greater number of effective parties in 
regional elections in all cases (7.45 vs 4.57).  The differences are significant (t=5.2, 
p<.01).  Not surprisingly, we see similar results for the electoral dominance of the two 
largest parties, which in all cases is greater in state-wide parliamentary elections than in 
regional elections.   
The results in Table 4 demonstrate that there are significant levels of dissimilarity 
across the two levels.  In his analysis of 4000 regional and national elections in 18 
countries Schakel (2013) explains that dissimilarity is lowest in vertically simultaneous 
elections, with average dissimilarity scores of 12. The average dissimilarity score for 
Ukraine, which was not included in Schakel’s study, is 31.84 when we examine all state-
wide parties, and 33.47 when we add regional parties.  No region reports a dissimilarity 
score of less than 16.07. This is obviously a greater degree of dissimilarity than we 
usually find, and suggests that Ukrainian voters are expressing distinct political 
preferences across electoral levels, despite low levels of regional institutional autonomy.  
If we examine dissimilarity scores for clusters of parties, rather than individual parties, we 
find greater similarity, which we expected, and in particular greater consistency for 
identity cleavages rather than the economic cleavage.  A brief evaluation of our 
preliminary hypotheses suggests that we have significant levels of dissimilarity, that this 
can in part be explained by greater degrees of fractionalization at the regional level, where 
regional parties are more present, and that clusters of parties display greater similarity, 
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with greater stability for the identity cleavages rather than the economic cleavage.20 The 
structure of party competition therefore appears to differ across levels in two important 
ways.  First, different parties – or rather different types of parties – fare better at one 
electoral level.  Second, the gap between vote shares at parliamentary and regional 
elections appears to differ geographically.  Identifying why this might be the case is the 
focus of our next section. 
Table 5 about here 
Second order theory suggests that regional institutional authority will determine 
whether regional elections can be perceived as second or first order contests.  We believe 
that while institutional authority might be important, so too might other indicators of 
regional salience, including identity and perceived distinctiveness.  To understand the 
factors that account for the performance of parties and clusters across different electoral 
levels, we have conducted a multivariate analysis of multi-level electoral competition.  
Table 5 contains the results of this analysis.  Second order theory would predict similar 
preferences at simultaneous elections but it is possible that in regions where regional 
identity and regional distinctiveness are strong, regional elections are in fact first order 
contests. The results in Table 5 therefore identify the variables that push together or drive 
apart political preferences at the state and regional level.  As the dependent variables are 
dissimilarity scores, we can interpret positive coefficients as accounting for greater 
dissimilarity, and negative coefficients as driving cross-level convergence.   
We have identified three groups of variables. The first speak to internal divisions 
within Ukraine, namely the Ukrainian-Russian divide.  We created four variables, two 
testing support for Ukrainian or Russian cultural identity and two probing support for and 
use of Ukrainian or Russian languages.  The four are, of course, clearly related.21 To 
probe the two distinct features we included in our regressions the variable on Ukrainian 
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language and the variable on Russian culture.  Full details of the variables may be found 
in the appendix. We would expect indicators of Ukrainian language to have a 
nationalising effect on voting (in other words prompting greater similarity across levels) 
and support for Russian culture to prompt greater dissimilarity as voters engage with 
regional concerns.  Our second group of variables concerns external engagement, and 
explores attitudes to Europe as well as attitudes to neighbours, in this case Russia, Poland, 
Slovakia and Romania.  Our second group of variables also includes measures of 
standards of living across the regions of Ukraine.  We would expect wealthier regions and 
those with greater engagement with Europe and neighbours to exert a nationalising impact 
on the vote.  Last, our third group of variables includes measures of regional identity, 
desired regional autonomy and a belief in regional distinctiveness. We would expect each 
of these to prompt higher levels of dissimilarity as voters engage in first order voting at 
both levels.  What we can see from the start is that none of the variables we have 
assembled is able to account for variations in the levels of dissimilarity among state-wide 
parties, with the exception of Russian culture: a one unit increase in Russian culture 
produces a .779 increase in the dissimilarity of state-wide parties, or, the more Russian an 
oblast, the more dissimilar the cross-level performance of its state-wide parties. This 
confirms our initial expectations but it is when we turn to the clusters that we begin to 
understand the dynamics of cross-level competition. 
If we cluster parties according to their economic attitudes, Russian culture is again 
a positive predictor of dissimilarity. Those oblasts with higher scores on Russian culture 
are more likely to display greater dissimilarity for the cross-level performance of parties 
clustered according to their economic views.  When we turn to the identity clusters we see 
that our variables are better able to account for variations across the different levels.  
Higher scores for the Ukrainian language produce a decrease in dissimilarity, as predicted 
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earlier, although it is worth noting that the opposite is true for the economic cluster of 
parties.  A desire for regional autonomy also brings political preferences together.  These 
results provide us with two findings. 
First, regional authority, the classic barometer of whether a regional election might 
be considered first order (Jeffery and Hough 2009), should facilitate divergence.  If both 
regional and state-wide contests are first order then we have no reason to anticipate 
similar results. What our results suggest, however, is that increases in regional authority 
prompt similar results across electoral levels when we cluster parties ideologically. This 
suggests we might wish to distinguish between different forms of first ordered-ness, 
namely institutional salience and sociological distinctiveness. 
Second, the distinction between language and culture suggests that if regional 
identities form around culture, we will see greater dissimilarity across state and regional 
elections than if they are formed around language.   We should distinguish, however, 
between the extent of dissimilarity and our ability to account for it.  The identity clusters 
are themselves more consistent across state and regional elections for some regions – 
which raises the possibility that identity is a more enduring cleavage of political 
competition – while what difference there is across levels we are better able to explain 
with the presence of our variables.   
Table 6 about here 
Previous multi-level voting research reminds us that dissimilarity across electoral 
levels is partially explained by the presence of regional parties and blocs. In 2006, 
regional parties and blocs were successful in eight of our regions but within these regions 
we are able to determine which factors drive support, and for which type of regional 
party.  Were we to lump all regional parties and blocs together, we would claim that 
oblasts with higher scores for the Russian culture, European identity and standard of 
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living prompt greater support for regional parties.  If we distinguish among the different 
types of regional parties and blocs, as we highlight above, we can see that standard of 
living relates only to those pragmatic regional parties and blocs, that is those parties who 
claim to represent the interests of territorial communities better than state-wide parties but 
refer neither to regionalist agendas nor to state-wide identity cleavages. The electoral 
success of ideological regional parties, that is those choosing to appeal to regional 
identities, however, is positively influenced by Ukrainian language and by Russian 
culture, as well as desired regional autonomy.  These findings further develop our 
understanding of markers of first-orderedness, namely sociological distinctiveness as 
captured by language and culture and regional autonomy, for they exert independent 
effects on dissimilarity. In regions with successful regional parties and blocs that appeal to 
political identities of their voters, sociological distinctiveness might help to explain the 
losses of state-wide parties at regional elections.  
Of course we know that one particular oblast is perceived to be particularly 
distinct. For this reason we replicated the results without Crimea in the dataset. When we 
do so, we see little change n the predictors significant at the .05 level in the original 
model. There are not changes at the .05 level in the all-parties model, the ideological 
cluster or for pragmatic regional parties and only one variable significant at the .05 level 
ceases to be significant for the regional parties model (Russian culture is no longer 
significant). All other significant variable perform as they did for the entire dataset.  There 
are two expectations to this, when we cluster parties according to the economic dimension 
the social distinctiveness variables (language and culture) ceases to be significant but the 
regional autonomy variable become significant, predicting similarity across levels.  With 
the ideological variables the regional distinctiveness variables remain significant but the 
social distinctiveness variables cease to be so.  In general, then, the language and culture 
 25 
variables are less strong when we exclude Crimea from the dataset but the regional 
autonomy variables as well as Europe and standard of living are fairly consistent across 
the two.  This might suggest that Crimea is elevating the perceived importance of 
Ukrainian-Russian distinctiveness when we look at Ukraine as whole. 
 
 
6. Conclusions 
An analysis of the vertically and horizontally simultaneous 2006 elections in Ukraine not 
only offers the first comprehensive analysis of multi-level voting in a post-Communist 
state, and thus widens the geographical area of a field typically restricted to established 
democracies in Western Europe and North America, it also advances our understandings 
of multi-level voting in general.  Our analysis relies on aggregate voting results and we 
must be mindful that any effort to understand the individual calculations made by voters 
requires an analysis of individual-level attitudes and behaviour.  This would help us to 
determine, for example, whether policy moderation, or the perceived competitiveness of 
elections (Burden and Kimball 2004) is in fact motivating voter behaviour, or whether 
individuals back different political parties if they have a stronger sense of regional 
identity or if they have more polarised or moderate preferences.  From the aggregate data 
we can draw five main conclusions. 
First, our findings confirm hypothesis one, showing that simultaneous multi-level 
elections in which there is little ‘at stake’ in regional elections, can still produce dissimilar 
voting behaviour across the two electoral arenas. Indeed we found dissimilarity scores 
more than twice those found in other studies (Schakel 2013).  This in itself is a significant 
finding as regional legislative autonomy is relatively low in Ukraine, something that 
would suggest regional elections should be second-order contests, fought and won on the 
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same issues as those determining state-level results.  Certainly if legislative autonomy is 
the only measure of salience we would have reason to doubt second-order theory.  In 
addition, our research also shows that the largest state-wide parties saw the largest 
deviation in vote shares across levels, with parties losing support in regional elections and 
losing most in their core regions of support.  One possible modification of second order 
theory, therefore, would distinguish not between the fortunes of government and 
opposition parties, but for large state-wide parties vis-à-vis small parties.   
We see greater nationalisation and lower fragmentation for state elections vis-à-vis 
regional elections, confirming hypothesis two.  The performance of smaller parties at 
regional elections is partly why we are able to demonstrate that regional elections are 
more fractionalised than state-wide elections (which in turn confirms hypothesis five).  
This is evident both in the lower levels of consolidation (measured as the proportion of 
support for the two largest parties) and higher numbers of effective parties for regional 
elections.   Our analysis also helps to identify the regions in which regional parties, as one 
important form of small parties, are likely to fare well, with higher standards of living 
driving the presence of pragmatic regional parties and Ukrainian language use and support 
influencing ideological regional parties.  Our third hypothesis, that we would see greater 
consistency by clusters is also confirmed.  Dissimilarity scores for the economic and 
ideological clusters are lower than for state-wide parties. 
Our fourth hypothesis, that dissimilarity can be explained by variations in regional 
identity and regional distinctiveness is also partially confirmed.  Our efforts to identify the 
variables most likely to drive apart cross level voting results vary by form, Russian 
culture most likely to drive apart state-wide parties in general as well as those treated as 
part of economic clusters.  Our analysis of identity clusters suggest that Ukrainian 
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language and desired regional autonomy makes voting more consistent,. What then, might 
we conclude of the utility of second order and balance approaches?   
Second order theory would predict similar preferences in simultaneous elections if 
the regional elections are in fact second-order contests.  We see, however, that the two 
simultaneous elections produce dissimilar results.  Balance theorists would suggest that 
we would see different results because voters would seek to punish incumbent state 
parties, but this does not appear to explain our results either.  Governing parties and 
opposition parties lose support in regional elections (and lose most in their core regions).  
We had assumed Ukrainian regional elections to be second-order contests due to low 
levels of regional institutional authority, but were they instead to be first order contests, 
the second-order elections theory would correctly predict divergent results.  When we 
include models that test regional salience – the mechanism that would transform second-
order contests to first-order contests - including for example, regional identity, perceived 
regional distinctiveness and support for further regional autonomy, we find that desired 
regional institutional salience drives preferences together. 
 When we turn to clusters we see increased tolerance for more moderate economic 
choices in regional elections, and for more polarised views with respect to foreign policy.  
This, we would argue, offers an important modification to balance hypotheses.  We 
interpret the results as suggesting that across levels there are varying degrees of tolerance 
for polarisation.  The balance hypothesis suggests that voters are intolerant of extreme 
political systems, preferring to achieve moderation by backing different partisan options 
that in the aggregate balance each other. The 2006 elections in Ukraine suggest that voter 
preference for balance and moderation might well be correct, but that tolerance for 
balance or extremism varies across electoral levels, with electorates offsetting more 
polarised political climates at one level with more moderate ones at another level.   The 
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issue, therefore, is not whether voters balance institutions to achieve a ‘moderate’ political 
culture, or whether they perceive one democratic institution to be more salient than 
another, but rather that the dynamics of political competition in different elections held on 
the same day demonstrate that parties and voters are motivated by different issues at 
different levels. 
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Table 1: Variations in electoral performance for vertically simultaneous state-wide 
and regional elections, Ukraine 2006  
 
 Party of 
Regions  
 
Yulia 
Tymoshenko 
Bloc  
Our Ukraine 
Bloc  
 
Communist 
Party of 
Ukraine  
Socialist 
Party of 
Ukraine  
 
Crimea  25.46 0.51 1.36 (2.01) 0.0 
Vinnytska  3.01 3.62 4.67 0.34 4.70 
Volynska  0.85 2.59 1.85 0.0 1.0 
Dnipropetrovska 18.98 2.53 (0.71) 0.65 3.8 
Donetska  11.74 0.0 0.0 (0.31) (1.35) 
Zhytomyrska  6.88 4.73 1.03 1.75 2.52 
Zakarpatska  7.15 1.09 2.79 0.0 0.54 
Zaporizhka  16.27 2.50 0.51 1.07 0.0 
Ivano-Frankivska  0.0 5.95 4.46 0.0 0.0 
Kyivska  3.76 7.17 2.84 0.0 2.51 
Kirovohradska  7.22 (0.95) 0.46 1.19 2.92 
Lvivska  3.01 8.61 11.33 0.0 0.0 
Luhanska  4.48 0.39 0.0 (0.40) 0.0 
Mykolaivska  18.87 1.36 2.05 0.89 0.77 
Odeska  22.72 1.08 2.07 3.18 (5.47) 
Poltavska  5.59 2.72 2.28 0.44 2.14 
Rivnenska  3.54 4.41 3.24 0.0 1.35 
Sumska  5.19 4.16 7.80 0.22 3.01 
Ternopilska  0.0 0.0 2.89 0.0 0.34 
Kharkivska  12.85 2.90 0.46 (0.26) 0.0 
Khersonska  16.37 2.68 2.49 1.75 0.85 
Khmelnytska  3.09 5.87 (1.77) 3.06 2.61 
Cherkaska  4.59 7.90 1.34 0.93 2.55 
Chernivetska  4.69 8.13 8.29 0.0 0.31 
Chernihivska  4.26 8.19 1.58 0.51 0.36 
Sevastopil  20.57 4.53 0.0 (0.01) 0.0 
Kyiv  6.0 14.58 6.99 0.0 1.55 
Mean gap(st dev) 8.78 (7.4) 3.97 (3.5) 2.60 (3.0) 0.48 (1.1) 1.00 (1.9) 
Figures indicate drop in support from state to regional election. Figures in parentheses 
indicate increased performance in regional elections. 
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Table 2: Regional political parties and blocs in the 2006 regional elections 
in Ukraine. 
 
Oblast Regional political parties and blocs  % support 
Crimea Union Party 
Kunitsyn Bloc  
7.62 
7.56 
 
Volynska Klymchuk Bloc ‘Native Volyn’  4.58 
 
Dnipropetrovska Lazarenko Bloc  11.3 
 
Zakarpatska Democratic Party of Hungarians in Ukraine 
The Community of the Hungarian Culture in 
Zakarpattya 
 
3.1 
3.3 
Ivano-Frankivska National Choice Bloc  
The Renaissance of Prykarpattya Bloc  
4.71 
3.01 
 
Lvivska Svoboda 5.62 
 
Sevastopil Ivanov ‘For Sevastopil’ Bloc  
Kondratevskyi Bloc  
6.44 
3.88 
 
Kyiv Chernovetskyi Bloc  
Civil Activists of Kyiv  
12.93 
4.01 
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Table 3 : Variations in support for clusters of parties and blocs 
 
 Average 
performance 
state-wide 
parliamentary 
elections 
Average 
performance  
regional 
elections 
Average difference 
Economic clusters (10.06)    
     Left 8.86 (5.72) 10.10 (5.85) -1.24 (3.0) 
     Middle 15.15 (11.66) 19.56 (12.08) -4.41 (7.54) 
     Right 51.59 (12.21) 40.77 (11.10) 10.81 (11.27) 
    
Foreign policy (7.3)    
     Russia 36.14 (23.44) 27.81 (20.91) 8.33 (4.89) 
     Neutral 24.31 (13.13) 25.33 (13.40) -1.03 (4.18) 
     EU/NATO 15.16 (11.66) 15.48 (13.82) -.32 (3.72) 
    
Language (7.05)    
     Russian language 32.38 (27.72) 25.05 (24.73) 7.33 (5.56) 
     Minority languages 31.50 (16.95) 29.00 (14.91) 2.50 (5.08) 
     Ukrainian language 16.85 (14.66) 15.24 (13.63) 1.61 (2.76) 
    
History (5.99)    
     Soviet Army saved Ukraine in 
WWII 
36.14 (23.44) 29.83 (23.55) 6.31 (5.03) 
     Both saved Ukraine in WWII 25.84 (13.82) 23.68 (12.71) 2.15 (3.82) 
     UPA saved Ukraine in WWII 16.85 (14.65) 15.24 (13.63) 1.60 (2.76) 
Results are average % won in each election with standard deviations in parentheses.  For 
difference, higher numbers indicate greater support in state elections. Negative numbers 
indicate improved performance at regional elections.
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Table 4: Multi-level voting in vertically simultaneous elections 
 State-wide parliamentary 
elections 
Regional elections Difference 
state-region 
Dissimilarity indices 
 Largest 
party  
Sum , 
2 
largest 
parties 
ENP 
 
Largest 
party 
Sum, 2 
largest 
parties 
ENP Sum, 2 
largest 
parties 
ENP State-
wide 
parties 
All 
parties 
Economic 
cluster 
Average, 
ideological 
clusters 
Crimea                                             PR 65.63 2.84 Yanuk 40.17 7.53 25.46 -4.70 48.09 55.68 45.04 2.90 
Vinnytska                                         YT 53.25 5.56 YT 44.96 7.87 8.29 -2.32 24.56 24.56 5.86 6.53 
Volynska                                          YT 64.63 4.09 YT 60.19 4.62 4.44 -.53 16.07 18.36 5.27 3.91 
Dnipropetrovska                                   PR 60.01 4.30 PR 38.50 9.58 21.51 -5.27 41.16 46.81 7.29 9.77 
Donetska                                          PR 80.43 1.82 PR 68.79 2.55 11.64 -.73 43.56 43.56 6.75 4.32 
Zhytomyrska                                       YT 42.91 7.09 YT 36.70 10.53 6.21 -3.44 27.47 27.47 12.23 7.64 
Zakarpatska                                       OU 46.08 6.90 OU 42.20 9.20 3.88 -2.30 28.86 32.06 8.80 7.15 
Zaporizhka                                         PR 62.17 3.52 PR 43.40 7.05 18.77 -3.54 40.62 40.62 8.91 6.00 
Ivano-Frankovska                                  OU 75.45 3.34 OU 65.04 4.32 10.41 -.98 29.67 33.53 1.65 4.35 
Kyivska                                           YT 56.13 4.31 YT 46.16 6.26 9.97 -1.95 22.63 22.63 5.46 5.15 
Kirovohradska                                     YT 50.23 6.47 YT 43.78 7.57 6.45 -1.09 21.97 21.97 8.69 7.43 
Lvivska                                           OU 70.99 3.87 OU 51.05 7.11 19.94 -3.23 32.93 35.74 4.10 7.40 
Luhanska                                          PR 79.54 1.79 PR 75.54 2.02 4.00 -.23 40.04 40.04 2.88 1.74 
Mykolaivska                                       PR 62.23 3.60 PR 42.09 7.87 20.14 -4.27 44.81 44.81 14.77 12.07 
Odeska                                            PR 57.36 4.03 PR 36.52 10.27 20.84 -6.24 46.95 48.55 18.22 11.55 
Poltavska                                         YT 47.19 6.67 YT 38.89 9.38 8.30 -2.71 24.96 24.96 5.90 5.31 
Rivnenska                                         YT 56.78 5.51 YT 49.13 7.06 7.65 -1.55 24.47 26.32 5.21 5.87 
Sumska                                            YT 52.64 5.74 YT 40.68 9.02 11.96 -3.27 27.10 27.10 8.71 9.02 
Ternopilska                                       YT 68.65 4.03 YT 65.76 4.44 2.89 -.41 21.02 21.02 5.94 3.64 
Kharkivska                                         PR 64.38 3.43 PR 48.63 5.88 15.75 -2.46 37.26 38.86 7.68 7.37 
Khersonska                                         PR 56.57 4.95 PR 37.52 11.43 19.05 -6.48 37.49 37.49 11.24 9.66 
Khmelnytska                                        YT 53.90 5.51 YT 49.80 6.85 4.10 -1.34 24.60 24.60 9.90 8.64 
Cherkaska                                         YT 51.64 5.17 YT 41.19 8.10 10.45 -2.93 21.26 21.26 10.01 6.97 
Chernivetska                                      YT 57.38 5.45 YT 40.96 10.47 16.42 -5.01 34.34 34.34 6.96 6.96 
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Chernihivska                                      YT 49.50 5.90 YT 38.22 9.45 11.28 -3.54 22.13 22.13 7.61 5.71 
Kyiv                                 YT 55.06 2.34 YT 37.57 4.80 17.49 -2.46 30.11 50.77 17.86 10.31 
Sevastopil                                               PR 74.35 5.05 PR 51.93 9.97 22.42 -4.92 45.61 38.58 18.63 5.43 
PR = Party of Regions, YT = Yulia Tymochenko, OU = Our Ukraine, Vit = Vitrenko bloc, SPU = Socialist Party of Ukraine, Lyt = Lytvyn 
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Table 5: Modelling dissimilarity across parties and clusters 
 
 Party dissimilarity 
State-wide 
δ 31.84 
Economic 
cluster 
dissimilarity 
δ =10.06 
Average identity 
cluster dissimilarity 
δ =6.78 
Constant 19.12 (11.47) -14.41 (10.68) 11.829 (4.32) *  
 
Ukrainian language 
Russian culture 
European identity 
External relations 
Standard of living 
-.127 (.08) 
.779 (.42) * 
.480 (.30) 
.390 (.27) 
3.14 (14.68)  
 
.136 (.08)* 
1.88(.39) *** 
.299 (.28) 
-.240 (.25) 
19.70 (13.67) 
-.058 (.03) * 
-.014 (.16) 
.211 (.11) * 
-.044 (.10) 
2.27 (5.53) 
 
Regional autonomy 
Regional distinctiveness 
Regional identity 
.088 (.25) 
.244 (.43) 
-.052 (.23) 
-.182 (.23) 
-.214 (.40) 
-.085 (.21) 
-.283 (.09) *** 
.065 (.16) 
.033 (.09)  
 
Adj R2 .560 .527 .220 
Results are unstandardized OLS regression coefficients with standard errors in 
parentheses.  *=p<.1, **=p<.05, ***=p<.01, δ = Dissimilarity score.  DS for identity 
cluster is average across all three components. 
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Table 6: Modelling support for regional parties and blocs. 
 
 All regional  
parties and blocs 
Ideological regional 
parties and blocs 
 
Pragmatic regional 
parties and blocs 
Constant -19.364 (6.93) -15.472 (4.97) *** -3.892 (4.85) 
 
Ukrainian language 
Russian culture 
European identity 
External relations 
Standard of living 
.054 (.05) 
.550 (.26) ** 
.403 (.18) ** 
.085 (.16) 
33.773 (8.88) *** 
 
 
.100 (.04) ** 
.638 (.18) *** 
.196 (.13) 
.135 (.12) 
4.690 (6.37) 
 
-.046 (.03) 
-.089 (.18) 
.207 (.13) 
-.050 (.11) 
29.08 (6.2) *** 
 
 
Regional autonomy 
Regional distinctiveness 
Regional identity 
.015 (.15) 
-.483 (.26) * 
.126 (.14) 
.213 (.11) * 
-.316 (.19) 
-.092 (.10)  
-.197 (.10) * 
-.168 (.18) 
-.034 (.10) 
Adj R2 .434 .389 .583 
Results are unstandardized OLS regression coefficients with standard errors in 
parentheses.  *=p<.1, **=p<.05, ***=p<.01 
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Appendix 
Scoring for Party Clusters 
If the party manifesto made no reference to cluster topics they were coded as missing. 
Economic cleavage 
(a) Scores 1-3, the left, parties and blocs opposed to liberalism, calling for increased 
share of state-owned property 
(b) Scores 4-6, the middle, parties and blocs who support further foreign and 
domestic privatisation of state-owned property and expect that state to increase 
public spending  
(c) Scores 7-9, the right, parties and blocs actively supporting further economic 
liberalisation and/or represent the interests of big business 
Foreign affairs22 
(a) Scores 1-3, parties and blocs in favour of stronger economic and military 
cooperation with Russia 
(b) Scores 4-6, ‘neutrals’ who suggest Ukrainian cooperation with the EU should not 
automatically preclude foreign trade with Russia score 
(c) Scores 7-9, parties and blocs eager to join NATO and to remove the Russian fleet 
from Sevastopil as soon as possible 
Language23 
(a) Scores 1-3, parties and blocs that call for the introduction of Russian as a state 
language, either across Ukraine as a whole or in specific regions 
(b) Scores 4-6, parties and blocs that support Ukrainian as a state language but 
promote minority language rights, including rights for Russian speakers 
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(c) Scores 7-9, parties and blocs that call for the increased use of Ukrainian in public 
services and the media throughout the state, regardless of the ethnic structures and 
linguistic profiles of regions 
History24  
(a) Scores 1-3, parties and blocs that claim the Soviet Army saved Ukraine during the 
WWII 
(b) Scores 4-6, parties and blocs seeking to remain neutral in their attitudes towards 
history 
(c)  Scores 7-9, parties and blocs who believe that the Soviet Army betrayed Ukraine 
during WWII. 
Manifestos 
Bloc Pora-PRP (‘Party of Reforms and the Order’) (2006) Pora Buduvaty, Diayty I 
Zhyty! [It’s Time to Build, Act and Live!] Manifesto of Bloc Pora-PRP ( ‘Party of 
Reforms and the Order’) for the 2006 elections. Available at 
http://www.cvk.gov.ua/pls/vnd2006/w6p001  (accessed 24 May 2012). 
Chernovetskyi Bloc (2006) Manifesto of the Chernovetskyi Bloc for the 2006 elections. 
Available at  http://www.kreschatic.kiev.ua/ua/2831/art/31028.html (accessed 24 
May 2012). 
Civic Activists of Kyiv (2006) Manifesto of the Civic Activists of Kyiv Available at  
http://www.radiosvoboda.org/content/backgrounderfullpage/1892018.html 
(accessed 24 May 2012). 
Communist Party of Ukraine (2006) Vladu I vlasnist narodu Ukrainy! [Power and 
Property to Working People Party!] Manifesto of the Communist Party of 
Ukraine for the 2006 parliamentary elections.  Available at 
http://www.cvk.gov.ua/pls/vnd2006/w6p001 (accessed 24 May 2012). 
Community of Hungarian Culture in Zakarpattya (2006) Statute of the Community of 
Hungarian culture in Zakarpattya Available at  
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Electoral Contestants (Blocs and Political Parties) 
Scores for clusters are in parentheses [economic, foreign affairs, language, history] 
 
Parties and blocs that won seats in the state-wide parliamentary and regional 
elections in 2006 
Communist Party of Ukraine [2, 1, 1, 1] 
Our Ukraine Bloc (The Congress of Ukrainian Nationalists + People’s Rukh of Ukraine25 
+ the Party of Industry and Business of Ukraine26 + Party of Christina-Democratic 
Union + Political Party ‘The National Union ‘Our Ukraine’’ + Ukrainian 
Republican Party ‘Sobor’) [6, 10, 10, 10] 
Party of Regions [7, 4, 1, 1] 
Socialist Party of Ukraine [3, 3, 4, 4] 
Yulia Tymoshenko Bloc (All-Ukrainian Association ‘Fatherland’ + Ukrainian Social-
Democratic Party) [7, 6, 5, 5] 
 
 
Parties and blocs that won seats in the the 2006 regional elections and but did not 
win seats in the 2006 parliamentary elections 
Kostenko and Pluishch Bloc (The Party of Free Peasants and Businessmen of Ukraine + 
Political Party ‘Ukraine United’ + Ukrainian People’s Party)  [8, 10, 10, 10] 
Lazarenko Bloc  (Party ‘Social-Democratic Union’ + Hromada Party + Social-
Democratic Party) [7, -, 5, -] 
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Lytvyn Bloc (People’s Party + Party of All-Ukrainian Association of the Left ‘Fairness’ 
+ Ukrainian Peasant Democratic Party) [5, 5, 5, 5] 
Oppositional Bloc 'Ne Tak' (All-Ukrainian Political Association ‘Women for Future + 
Political Party ‘All-Ukrainian Association ‘The Centre’’ + the Republican Party 
of Ukraine + the Social-Democratic Party of Ukraine (united)) [7, 4, 3, 3] 
Bloc Pora-PRP (PORA Party + 'Party of Reforms and the Order') [9, 10, 10, 10] 
Viche [9, 5, -, -] 
Vitrenko Bloc 'People's Opposition' (Party ‘Russian-Ukrainian Union’ (RUS) + 
Progressive Socialist Party) [1, 1, 1, 1] 
 
Parties and blocs that won the 2006 regional elections and did not stand in the 2006 
parliamentary elections 
Electoral Bloc ‘Civic Activists of Kyiv’ (Kyiv city branches of Liberal-Democratic Party 
of Ukraine + The Party of Legislative Supporters of Non-Governmental 
Organisations of Ukraine – ‘Party of Legislative Support’ + People’s Party of 
Banks’ Investord and Social Security) [4, -, -, -] 
Electoral Bloc of Leonid Chernovetskyi (Kyiv city branches of Christian-Liberal Party of 
Ukraine + Ukranian Party ‘Green Planet’) [4, -, -, -] 
Ivanov Bloc 'For Sevastopil' (Sevastopil city branches of Party of Industry and Business 
of Ukraine and the Party ‘Christian-Democratic Union’) [5, 1, 1, 1] 
Klymchuk Bloc 'Native Volyn' (Volyn branches of Motherland Party; Republican-
Christian Party and Ukrainian Conservative Party) [5, -, -, -] 
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Kondratevskyi Bloc (Sevastopil branches of the Party of National-economic development 
of Ukraine and Young Ukraine Party) [5, 1, 1, 1] 
Kunitsyn Bloc (Crimean organisations of National-Democratic Party, Democratic Party 
of Ukraine and Party of State Neutralism of Ukraine) [5, 1, 1, 1] 
National Choice Bloc (Ivano-Frankivsk regional branches of the Congress of Ukrainian 
Nationalists27 and Ukrainian Republican Party ‘Sobor’) [5, 10, 10, 10] 
Bloc 'The Renaissance of Prykarpattya'  (Ivano-Frankivsk regional branches of the 
following parties: Renaissance + Republican-Christian Party + Democratic 
Union) [4, 5, -, -] 
Russian Bloc Party28 [1, 1, 1, 1] 
Yanukovych Bloc (Party of Regions + The Russian Bloc Party) [4, 1, 1, 1] 
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Variables 
 
Ukrainian language  (α =.924 ) 
Additive index created from: 
* Ukraine should be the only state and official language 
* Speak Ukrainian at home 
* Ukrainian native language 
Russian culture (α =.689) 
Additive index created from: 
* In 20-25 years Russian cultural traditions will dominate the Ukraine 
* In 20-25 years Soviet cultural traditions will dominate the Ukraine 
* Identify with Soviet cultural tradition 
* Identify with Russian cultural tradition 
+Russian national identity 
External relations (α = .945) 
Additive index created from: 
*How close do you feel (0-10) to: 
Hungary (8, 9, 10 close) 
Slovakia (8, 9, 10 close) 
Romania (8, 9, 10 close) 
Poland (8, 9, 10 close) 
Europe (α = .620) 
Additive index created from: 
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* Identify with all-European cultural tradition 
* In 20-25 years all European cultural tradition will dominate in Ukraine 
Standard of living (α = .856) 
Additive index created from: 
# Index of finances 
# Living conditions 
# Level of education 
# Demographic development 
# Job market development 
# Welfare 
Regional autonomy (α =.584) 
Additive index created from: 
* One would like oblast to gain autonomy in Ukraine 
* One would like oblast to get more competencies 
Regional distinctiveness 
* Western and eastern Ukraine are so different that can be called two 
different peoples 
Regional identity 
+ To which geographic group do you belong first (region). 
 
NOTES: α = Cronbach’s Alpha. Original data sources: * Razumkov Centre, + World 
Values Survey, # Ministry 
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FOOTNOTES 
                                                 
1 Throughout, we refer to the regional level as the meso-level, between the state and 
municipal or local level.  We use regional and sub-state interchangeably. 
2 Here regional elections mean the elections to the Parliament of Crimea, to Kyiv and 
Sevastopil city assemblies and to regional assemblies in 24 oblasts of Ukraine.  The 
OSCE judged the 2006 elections in Ukraine to be free and fair (OSCE, 2006). 
3 We distinguish between two issues: the extent to which individual voters express similar 
preferences across electoral levels; and the decision-making calculus of voters, whether, 
for example, they evaluate the issues, leaders, parties and policies specific to the level for 
which they are casting a ballot.  Reaching the same voting decision can of course be 
arrived at through different processes.  Individuals can vote according to state factors in 
both elections and support the same parties or might choose different parties if there are 
variations in the supply of options at different electoral levels.  Alternatively, individuals 
might evaluate each election on its own terms and find themselves drawn to similar or to 
different parties. The two issues: similarity of preference outcomes (votes cast) and the 
similarity of the decision-making process (voter motivations) are therefore distinct. 
4 Massetti (2009) notes, for example, that there are approximately thirty regionalist 
parties that are significant players in regional party systems.   
5 In the paper we refer to political cleavages that were salient during the particular 
electoral campaign, rather than to the classic understanding of sociological cleavages 
(Lipset and Rokkan 1967).   
6 According to the Law on Local Self-Government in Ukraine (2001), which governs 
regional assemblies, legislatures can set tax rates over estate property and parking. In all 
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but Crimea taxes levied are sent to the centre, which then redistributes these to the 
oblasts. Each regional assembly therefore has discretionary power over the distribution of 
regional spending returned from the centre. They have little institutional influence over 
constitutional debates and no right to protect minority languages in their region.  The 
Crimean parliament has more authority, with primary legislative power, and the ability to 
form a government with a Prime Minster, albeit one appointed by the Crimean Parliament 
with the consent of the Ukrainian President.   
7 According to the Law on Political Parties in the Ukraine (2001), all parties should 
maintain a state-wide programme of social development (Article 2), and prove their 
public support in at least 2/3 of districts in at least 2/3 of regions (Article 10).   
8  Specifically, the Law on Elections of Deputies in Ukraine (2004) allows the same party 
to stand as part of a bloc with other parties for one election (parliamentary or regional) 
and as a stand alone party at the other electoral level. 
9 A rare exception from this trend includes the most recent studies of regional elections in 
Russia (Ross 2011a, 2011b) that link party competition at regional elections with state-
wide democratic record and encourage us to investigate voting behaviour at regional 
elections in other post-communist states. 
10 During the 2006 electoral campaign, government and pro-government parties and blocs 
coalesced into the Orange team10 (Copsey 2006; Hesli 2007; Kachanovski 2008, see also 
Mykhnenko and Swain 2012).  Mainly national democrats (Way 2005), these were 
represented by state-wide parties and blocs such as the Yulia Tymoshenko Bloc, the Our 
Ukraine Bloc, by small and new blocs of parties such as Pora-PRP and the Kostenko-
Pliushch Bloc, as well as a small and established party Rukh. The opposition camp was 
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mainly represented by the Party of Regions. Its leader Viktor Yanukovych lost the 2004 
presidency, but the party still had parliamentary representation in 2005-06. Parties of the 
Ukrainian left (the Socialist Party of Ukraine, the Communist Party of Ukraine, and the 
Vitrenko Bloc) are classified as state-wide small parties. The largest state-wide parties 
and blocs therefore included the Yulia Tymoshenko Bloc, the Our Ukraine Bloc, and the 
Party of Regions 
11 The Community of Hungarian Culture in Zakarpattya, and Democratic Party of 
Hungarians in Ukraine 
12 For example Svoboda, The Russian Bloc Party 
13 For example, the Chernovetskyi Bloc, the Civic Activists of Kyiv. 
14 Yakymenko (2008) notes that Ukrainian voters pay attention to party manifestos while 
casting their ballot. The party manifestos and the activities of political parties and blocs is 
very important for 60.2% of voters and relatively important for 26.5% of voters. This is 
further supported by a more recent study showing that voters are affected by party 
manifestos, ideas and suggestions (Democratic Initiatives Foundation 2012). In his 2008 
report Yakymenko claims that the differences between parties are small on issues such as 
the rule of law and respect to human rights but he later clarifies that parties offer 
meaningful differences, particularly with respect to language policy and foreign policy; 
two of the items we have evaluated. This later view is supported by research both before 
and after the 2006 elections (Romanyuk and Shveda 2005; See also UNIAN news item  
(2012) on research by Dr Oleksandr Vyshnyak).  
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15 Dissimilarity = 
2
1
∑
=
−
n
i
iris xx
where xis is performance at state elections and xir is 
performance at regional elections. 
16 In one particular region the presence of regional parties complicates our understanding 
of the similarity of voting preferences. In Crimea, the Party of Regions did not run as a 
separate political party in the regional elections, but teamed with the Russian Bloc (party) 
to run as the Yanukovich Bloc. Voters seeking to exercise uniform political preferences 
would therefore have had to cast a ballot for different political actors. Also in Crimea, 
Rukh ran as a separate party in regional elections but as part of the Our Ukraine Bloc in 
state-level parliamentary elections. For the analysis that follows, we treat the Yanukovich 
bloc as the equivalent of the Party of Regions and Rukh as the equivalent of Our Ukraine 
Bloc for the regional elections in Crimea.  Once we turn to clusters these issues 
disappear. 
17 Effective number of parties = 
( )∑
=
n
i
ip
1
2
1 Where pi is the proportion of valid votes earned 
by a political party.  See also Golosov (2010) for an alternative formula.   
18 The survey was conducted 31 May – 18 June 2007. Sample size is 10,956.  The survey 
was conducted in 403 locations (212 urban and 191 rural ones). The theoretical error of 
the sample, disregarding design-effect, is no more than 1.0%.  
19 We rely on language use rather than native language. See Kulyk 2008 on the 
significance of this distinction. 
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20 There are statistically significant differences (p<.1) in dissimilarity scores for those 
regions where regional parties compete and those where they do not. 
21 Collinearity disagnostics, as well as correlations among the variables suggest it would be problematic to 
include all four in a regression equation. For this reason we have chose the two variables that do not present 
collinearity problems (in this case tolerance levels less than .2, a variance inflation factor (VIF) greater than 
5) (Hair et al 2006). We are also subscribing to best practice on the ratio of predictors to sample size (Van 
Voorhis and Morgan 2007). 
22 Neutrality in foreign affairs means avoiding membership in international military blocs 
and prioritising the interests of national business rather than fostering membership in 
international economic unions. 
23 According to the 1996 Constitution, Ukrainian is the only state official language, and it 
is impossible to introduce a second state language without constitutional changes. 
Nevertheless, calls to introduce Russian as the second state language were frequent 
during electoral campaigns 
24  Attitudes to history not only reflect preferences for public policies in education (such 
as the teaching and research of history), but also reflect identity politics (Rodgers 2006). 
Interpretations of history played a crucial role in the nation-building project of President 
Victor Yushchenko (Motyl 2010).  Here attitudes towards history include attitudes 
towards World War II and the Holodomor (the Great Famine) of 1932-33 in Ukraine.  
For example, both the Soviet Army and the Ukrainian Patriotic Army (UPA) participated 
in World War II but were on opposing sides.  Contemporary public opinion is divided on 
the extent to which one or the other defended or betrayed Ukraine (Motyl 2010).   
25 Rukh campaigned on its own in Crimea in regional elections. 
26 Party of Industry and Business of Ukraine won seats in Lvivska regional assembly on 
its own. 
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27 The Congress of Ukrainian Nationalists joined the Our Ukraine Bloc at the 
parliamentary elections 
28 Campaigned individually in Sevastopil’ 
